The WebJob Project uses GNU Privacy
Guard (GnuPG) to sign distribution checksum files. GnuPG is an
OpenPGP compliant application.
By signing distribution checksums, The WebJob Project asserts that
each MD5 digest contained in a given checksum file is accurate and
uncorrupt. Therefore, if you are able to verify the GnuPG signature
and all MD5 checksums, then you have probably downloaded the
distribution we intended for you to receive.
This, of course, assumes that the distribution files, including
the .sig file, have not been compromised. While it is unlikely that
the .sig file could be altered by an attacker, it could be replaced
either in-transit to SourceForge's ftp server or once it's there.
Unless you personally know who the signer is and have verified his
or her key, you can't really conclude much.
It's important to understand that our signature on a checksum file
does not assert anything about the content contained within the
corresponding distribution file. Signing distribution files can be
misleading because it implies that their content is somehow devoid
of anything that might be harmful. However, even with best intentions
and practices, distribution files can fall victim to maleficence.
The key used to sign WebJob distributions is available here. This key belongs
to Klayton Monroe and should have the following ID and fingerprint:
ID = 4D86DBFC, Fingerprint = 6D3B 1DBC F426 36E4 7C9A FA93 9A5D D62D 4D86 DBFC
Warning: Don't implicitly trust the information provided here
to validate the signer's key.